Additionally, Koubi[42] develops a model of military technological races that suggests the level of spending on research and development varies with changes in an actors relative position in a race. What is the difference between 'negative' and 'positive' peace? [30] Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Report for Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf: 71-110. If both choose to leave the hedge it will grow tall and bushy but neither will be wasting money on the services of a gardener. The theory outlined in this paper looks at just this and will be expanded upon in the following subsection. In a security dilemma, each state cannot trust the other to cooperate. In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Huntington[37] makes a distinction between qualitative arms races (where technological developments radically transform the nature of a countrys military capabilities) and quantitative arms races (where competition is driven by the sheer size of an actors arsenal). The primary difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken, however, is that both actors failing to cooperate is the least desired outcome of the game. This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. Additional readings provide insight on arms characteristics that impact race dynamics. The matrix above provides one example. (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement; What is the difference between structural and operational conflict prevention? Combining both countries economic and technical ecosystem with government pressures to develop AI, it is reasonable to conceive of an AI race primarily dominated by these two international actors. A day passes. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. [16], On one hand, these developments outline a bright future. endobj [35] Outlining what this Coordination Regime might look like could be the topic of future research, although potential desiderata could include legitimacy, neutrality, accountability, and technical capacity; see Allan Dafoe, Cooperation, Legitimacy, and Governance in AI Development, Working Paper (2016). To what extent does today's mainstream media provide us with an objective view of war? Since this requires that the fish have no way to escape, it requires the cooperation of many orcas. 2020 Yale International Relations Association | New Haven, CT, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, Interview with YPG volunteer soldier Brace Belden, Shaping Saddam: How the Media Mythologized A Monster Honorable Mention, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Percent of benefits Actor A can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Percent of benefits Actor B can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Actor As perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Actor Bs perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Actor As perceived harm from developing a harmful AI, Actor Bs perceived harm from developing a harmful AI. PDF The Stag Hunt - University of California, Irvine There is a substantial relationship between the stag hunt and the prisoner's dilemma. One is the coordination of slime molds. Prisoner's Dilemma - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [39] D. S. Sorenson, Modeling the Nuclear Arms Race: A Search for Stability, Journal of Peace Science 4 (1980): 16985. For example, suppose we have a prisoner's dilemma as pictured in Figure 3. It involves a group of . Additionally, both actors perceive the potential returns to developing AI to be greater than the potential harms. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change.[1]. [13] And impressive victories over humans in chess by AI programs[14] are being dwarfed by AIs ability to compete with and beat humans at exponentially more difficult strategic endeavors like the games of Go[15] and StarCraft. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. HW?n9*K$kBOQiBo1d\QlQ%AAW\gQV#j^KRmEB^]L6Rw4muu.G]a>[U/h;@ip|=PS[nyfGI0YD+FK:or+:=y&4i'kvC I discuss in this final section the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory outlined above in practice. For example, Jervis highlights the distinguishability of offensive-defensive postures as a factor in stability. Can you think of any situations of scenarios in international Moreover, the AI Coordination Regime is arranged such that Actor B is more likely to gain a higher distribution of AIs benefits. The payoff matrix is displayed as Table 12. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. The complex machinations required to create a lasting peace may well be under way, but any viable agreementand the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces that would entailrequires an Afghan government capable of holding its ground on behalf of its citizens and in the ongoing struggle against violent extremism. 0000002252 00000 n At the same time, there are great harms and challenges that arise from AIs rapid development. Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate Created Date: 20160809151831Z Also, trade negotiations might be better thought of as an iterated game the game is played repeatedly and the nations interact with each other more than once over time. . genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The Stag Hunt 2,589 views Aug 6, 2020 A brief introduction to the stag hunt game in international relations. 695 20 Those in favor of withdrawal are skeptical that a few thousand U.S. troops can make a decisive difference when 100,000 U.S. soldiers proved incapable of curbing the insurgency. No payoffs (that satisfy the above conditions including risk dominance) can generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where Stag is played with a probability higher than one half. [56] look at three different types of strategies governments can take to reduce the level of arms competition with a rival: (1) a unilateral strategy where an actors individual actions impact race dynamics (for example, by focusing on shifting to defensive weapons[57]), (2) a tacit bargaining strategy that ties defensive expenditures to those of a rival, and (3) a negotiation strategy composed of formal arms talks. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. 2.2 Prominent Actors in International Relations - Pearson Additionally, the defector can expect to receive the additional expected benefit of defecting and covertly pursuing AI development outside of the Coordination Regime. Schelling and Halperin[44] offer a broad definition of arms control as all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.. Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. (e.g., including games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt). As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. An example of norm enforcement provided by Axelrod (1986: 1100) is of a man hit in the face with a bottle for failing to support a lynching in the Jim Crow South. SCJ Int'l L. & Bus. Uncategorized, Mail (will not be published) Julian E. Barnes and Josh Chin, The New Arms Race in AI, Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-arms-race-in-ai-1520009261; Cecilia Kang and Alan Rappeport, The New U.S.-China Rivalry: A Technology Race, March 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/us-china-trade-technology-deals.html. Name four key thinkers of the theory of non-violent resistance, Gandhi, martin luther king, malcon X, cesar chavex. Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this.
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